t is often said that the First World War marks a watershed in modern history. From the mobilization of armies of unfathomable size-more than 60 million men put on uniforms between 1914 and 1918-to the no less mind-boggling human cost of the conflict, both at the front and beyond it (estimated military and civilian deaths were nearly equal, at some 8 million each), the war of 1914 broke all historical precedent in the scale of its devastation. Ruling houses that had endured for centuries-the Romanov, Habsburg, and Ottoman-shook, tottered, and fell, unleashing yet more misery as these precariously assembled multiethnic empires were wracked by internecine warfare. As the war of 1914 spread beyond Europe into the Balkans and Middle East, racial and religious score-settling and reprisals led inevitably to large-scale ethnic cleansing, with millions of civilians uprooted from their ancestral homes, which most would never see again. Even the victorious Western powers, France and Britain, suffered a collapse in cultural confidence that arguably has never been repaired. After centuries of progress had brought the West to a position of unparalleled domination of global affairs, it took only four years for the whole glittering edifice of European civilization to fall apart.
If 1914-18 marked an epitaph for Old Europe, we may usefully ask: Was it murder or suicide? Popular historians have usually leaned toward the latter verdict, viewing the catastrophe of 1914 as a tragedy of miscalculation, the idea being that no European statesmen were truly guilty of intending the war, at least not the horrendous global war of attrition that it turned into.
1 Since the Fritz Fischer debate of the 1960s professional historians have generally favored the former explanation, explaining the war's outbreak in terms of German and/or Austrian premeditation, coming down with a verdict of, if not outright homicide, then at least civilizational manslaughter. The German decision for war in 1914, Holger Herwig writes in a recent scholarly collection on the conflict, was not quite Fischer's aggressive and deliberate "bid for world power" but rather "a nervous, indeed panicked 'leap into the dark' to secure the Reich's position of semihegemony on the Continent." 2 In the new "consensus" interpretation, Berlin still bears primary responsibility, no longer for premeditated imperial aggression in the sense implied by the Versailles Treaty and by Fischer, but for an impulsive preemptive strike to ward off incipient strategic decline, with further mitigation in that the Germans received a strong assist in unleashing the dogs of war from their equally panic-stricken (and equally pessimistic) Austrian allies. 3 This sort of moderate academic consensus is usually welcomed. Now that so few historians have a real personal or patriotic stake in the controversy (as many Germans with memories of both world wars still did in the 1960s), scholars working in the field today are spared the bitter acrimony of the Fritz Fischer years. Even on the level of practical politics, with the centennial approaching, there is now a sense of "goodbye to all that"-literally, as the last German reparations payment was finally processed in 2010! 4 Much as there is to recommend the current consensus on the war of 1914, however, there is also much not to like. The first problem with any consensus is that it is static, and unlikely to inspire new scholarship. Say what one might about the nastiness of the Fischer debate: precisely because of its sharp edge it stimulated years of fresh research and passionate argument. A young historian today, by contrast, is not likely to be encouraged to tackle perhaps the biggest question of modern history (responsibility for the First World War and its consequences) after reading the kind of works published in recent years, which tend to declare the matter closed to further discussion.
The second problem grows directly out of the To be sure, there is wiggle room inside the current consensus. Some historians focus their fire on the Austrian statesmen who deliberately hounded Serbia into war, others more on the policy makers in Berlin who urged them on. 5 Others, like Niall Ferguson, accept primary Austro-German responsibility but still have harsh words for Britain, which, alone among the five main powers, was aloof enough from the two main alliances to have easily stayed out. With her decision to enter the war, a European war became a global one. 6 And some German authors continue quietly to question the Germanocentric explanation about the outbreak of the war of 1914, even if their works are usually dismissed or simply ignored by the dominant English-language historians. 7 This, though, is about it. It's been almost forty years since a major non-German historian was brave enough to tackle the Germanocentric consensus about the outbreak of war in 1914. The historian was L.C.F. Turner, who looked seriously into Russia's role in the July crisis. Yet he focused mostly on the timing of Russia's early mobilization, while paying little attention to Russia's foreign policy objectives in going to war-a subject that remains largely opaque to most First World War generalists. 8 Although this was not his intention, Turner's work indirectly buttressed the popular-historical explanation of 1914 as a "tragedy of miscalculation," as he showed how statesmen such as Sazonov and Bethmann Hollweg unwittingly boxed themselves in by authorizing "limited" military measures (Russia's "partial" mobilization against Austria in Sazonov's case, Austria's declaration of war on Serbia in that of Bethmann Hollweg) while failing to perceive that these "limited" measures made general war inevitable. 9 If we take the modified Turner "tragedy of miscalculation" thesis as the popular pole in current thinking about 1914, and the modified Fischer (Herwig/Fromkin) "German-Austrian preemptive strike" as its scholarly opposite, there is a bit more room to maneuver than simply inside the latter consensus among professional historians. Even so, the two poles are not that far apart. Both interpretations still give the benefit of the doubt to statesmen like Bethmann Hollweg and Sazonov, if not also to the trigger-happy generals who advised them. On the German side, Bethmann Hollweg and especially Moltke have been harshly judged, to be sureFromkin even fingers the chief of the German general staff as the "modest, unexceptional, and indeed rather ordinary career army officer [who] started the Great War."
CONTENTS
10 And yet there is mitigation even in this judgment: Fromkin cites as evidence of guilt Moltke's later "confession" to having started the war, which suggests a man wracked by moral doubts more than an unrepentant war criminal. This is characteristic of what we might call the post-Fischer view of 1914, in which the German "crime" was not one of conscious aggressive intention, but more a tragic decision born of a mixture of fear and foreboding. Nuanced as it is, there still seems something odd about this sort of bloodless explanation of the outbreak of the bloodiest war in history (until its sequel arrived in 1939). Could the war really have been about nothing more than a German officer and his complexes? Or, adopting the only slightly less bloodless popular explanation, did more than 15 million people die, with countless more millions wounded and/or deprived of their senses by shell shock (not to mention those later killed in conflicts born of the breakup of empires in the First World War) all because of a series of accidental miscalculations by basically well-intentioned statesmen?
It is not impossible, of course, that terrible events can have senseless causes-one thinks of natural disasters like earthquakes and hurricanes. But this is hardly true of the First World War, which was a manmade calamity if there ever was one. Someone must have done something with malice aforethought to produce such colossal carnage. Presumably, considering the human scale and geographical breadth of the carnage, there must have been at least several rival someones, with different, presumably clashing plans, to conjure up such global destructiveness.
Which men, in short, made the various calamities of the First World War, and for what reasons? If we pose the question in this way, it becomes obvious that Moltke (or Bethmann Hollweg) cannot alone shoulder the burden of blame. Whether or not Fischer was right that the German statesmen of 1914 were collectively lusting for "world power," that is, for an enlarged global empire that would rival Great Britain's, there were surely some men in Berlin who thought in these terms-who were paid, in fact, to do so. Some of these men, in turn, must have dreamed up and written down plans envisioning how this might come about, plans that would presumably involve weakening the British Empire so as to enable the Germans to supplant it.
The Germans were not alone in this prewar (and then wartime) geopolitical scheming, of course. Russian plans for the seizure of Austrian Galicia, along with Constantinople and the Straits, were far advanced by 1914 and no great secret among diplomatic professionals. France's claim on AlsaceLorraine was openly avowed, with her plans to conquer this lost province assumed matter-of-factly by German military planners. Britain's plans to absorb Germany's African colonies did not come out of nowhere, nor did her wartime initiatives in Arabia, Palestine, and Mesopotamia (even if these, like French encroachment in Syria and Palestine, were made possible only after Ottoman entry into the war, which both London and Paris initially sought to prevent).
If the Germans were not alone in cooking up plans of imperial conquest, however, they were uniquely prolific and even creative in doing so. Some of these plans, as Fischer showed us, were in place long before the war, especially those dealing with the Ottoman Empire. These preexisting plots to disrupt and dismantle the British, Russian, and French empires may not have caused the war in quite the way Fischer suggested; but they did help determine the uncompromising character of the war, along with much of its geographical and even political course. As the Kaiser himself wrote on July 30, 1914, "[England] must . . . have the mask of Christian peaceableness torn publicly off her face . . . . Our consuls in Turkey and India, agents, etc., must inflame the whole Mohammedan world to wild revolt against this hateful, lying, conscienceless nation of shopkeepers. If we are to be bled to death, at least England shall lose India." 11 Written at a time when Germany had not even begun mobilizing, and nearly a week before Britain entered the war, these words suggest that a good deal more than premonitory strategic fear was at work in driving the German decision for war.
Of course, Wilhelm II was notoriously moody and unstable, not least when he was composing these kinds of "marginalia" on diplomatic reports (in this case, on a dispatch from Friedrich Pourtalès, Germany's ambassador in St. Petersburg, reporting that general Russian mobilization was underway). And yet, however melodramatic in tone, the Kaiser's words were not idle: they represented real German policy. As early as August 2, 1914, after the war between Germany and Russia had begun but before France and Britain had gone in, Berlin signed an alliance treaty with the Ottoman Empire with the intention of unleashing Islamic holy war against the Entente Powers. As Moltke instructed the German foreign office just three days later (after Britain had finally entered the war), "revolution in India and Egypt, and also in the Caucasus, is of the highest importance. The treaty with Turkey will make it possible for the foreign office to realize the idea and awaken the fanaticism of Islam." 12 To promote this Turco-German "jihad," and much else besides, the German foreign office established a kind of all-purpose sabotage bureau for "Seditious Undertakings Against Our Enemies" (Unternehmungen und Aufwiegelungen gegen unsere Feinde), under the authority of Arthur Zimmermann, the under-secretary of state. The operational mastermind of the holy war stratagem was Baron Max von Oppenheim, a confidant of the Kaiser's who had been scheming for years to unleash global jihad against the British Empire. 13 This is, however, taking perhaps too literal a reading of Wesendonck's memorandum. To modify Marx, imperial sabotage stratagems do not always produce the revolutions they foresee; but if prepared by serious and imaginative Germans, they do seem to produce revolutions. The German jihad stratagem, when combined with Berlin's ill-fated dalliance with Zionism, proved incendiary, not least because it provoked the British into taking aggressive countermeasures. Kitchener's notoriously ill-conceived offer of a renewed, non-Ottoman Caliphate to Sherif Hussein of Mecca in the winter of 1914-15 actually rehashed an old idea born in the Cairo residency during the "Aqaba" crisis of 1906, the initiative on both occasions being provoked by the Germans' use of the Ottoman caliphate to stir Muslim opinion against the British. Hussein's vaunted "Arab revolt" of 1916, which according to the popular "Lawrence of Arabia" legend spawned secular Arab nationalism, was in fact couched locally in purely Islamic terms, as a protest against the sacrilegious acts of the Young Turks, beginning with their illegal deposition of Sultan-caliph Abdul Hamid II in 1909: Hussein was laying claim to the caliphate they had thus besmirched (and which Hussein thought the British had promised him). In similar fashion, the Balfour declaration of November 2, 1917 envisioning the creation of a "national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine was issued in response to an editorial by a German Zionist in the Vossische Zeitung published several weeks previously, which frightened Whitehall into thinking the Germans were about to make their own move. The British endorsement of Zionism that led to the creation of the state of Israel, like the British-supported "Arab revolt" that helped split the Ottoman Empire in two, was hatched in retaliation to Germany's own revolutionary sabotage stratagems.
In the case of the Russian Revolutions of 1917, the connection to German policy was even more direct. German generals, on the advice of German Had Zimmermann's sabotage bureau not so stupidly sabotaged the German position in the West, the revolutions of the East would have turned out considerably differently.
